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Available online 22 February 2014AbstractDespite the financial sector liberalization and openness that started in the earlier 90’s and significant macroeconomic development as well as
increasing inflow of capital toward the region, there is not any evidence of the reduction of interest rates as well as banks’ profits in Latin
America. In this paper we develop a model to estimate the determinants of Latin American banks’ profitability and, try to understand the reasons
why banks are reluctant to decrease their interest rate spreads even when change in competitiveness in the financial system is improving. By
using Data Envelopment Analysis to better exploit the information of several variables at the same time and, by employing a sample of 200
Banks located in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela; we
find that banks’ profits grew consistently above the normal levels of profits adjusted by risk. Our results show that banks in Latin America have
been profiting from their oligopolistic position in detriment of their clients in particular and of their whole economy in general.
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During the 90’s most of Latin American economies started
to open their economies and to liberalize their financial sys-
tems which were mostly controlled by their governments until
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the region changed and that a significant inflow of foreign
capital moved toward their banking systems. Capital inflows
took the form of foreign direct investments and portfolio in-
flows.3 During the 90’s the region got an inflow of 180 billions
of dollars (Cravino, Lederman, & Ollareaga, 2007). However,
banks’ competitiveness did not necessarily improve after this
period of financial liberalization and capital growth.
In Tables 1and 2 we present information about three of the
most representative countries in our sample. The information in
these tables corresponds to the years 1990 and 2007; respec-
tively. Table 1 shows that besides the significant participation of
foreign capital in the banking system, there is still an evident
banking concentration: The top 5 banks of each of the3 An additional form of capital inflow took the form of remittances.
ting by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Table 1
Banks’ deposit concentration in Latin America before liberalization (1990).
Country Number of
banks
Foreign-owned
banks (%)
Deposit in top 5
banks (%)
GDP growth
(%)
Argentina 105 51 44 1.338
Brazil 149 n.a. 19 4.168
Peru 18 41 77 5.09
This table presents some statistics for a subsample of countries under study.
The data presented in this table corresponds to 1990.
Table 2
Banks’ deposit concentration in Latin America after liberalization (2007).
Country Number of
banks
Foreign-owned
banks (%)
Deposit in top
5 banks (%)
GDP growth
(%)
Argentina 122 31 47 9.179
Brazil 167 54 27 3.160
Peru 22 59 71 6.827
This table presents some statistics for a subsample of countries under study.
The data presented in this table corresponds to 2007.
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overall deposits in the system. This table shows that concen-
tration and market imperfection, i.e. oligopoly, appears to be a
typical characteristic in the banking system in this region.4
From Tables 1 and 2,5 we can observe that Brazil and
Argentina have the largest number of banks. However and
even though both countries have more than 100 banks, their
banks’ deposit concentration is not only high but also has
increased since 1990 from 44% to 47% and from 16% to 27%
for Argentina and Brazil, respectively. Peru’s concentration
has decreased (from 77% to 71%) but it is still one of the
highest in the region. Accordingly, the size of the country or
the number of banks does not matter and, apparently, there is
always a high concentration ratio that has not been wiped out
with the financial liberalization and the inflow of capital to-
wards the region.
Banks’ concentration in Latin America can be traced back
to the early 1900s when the Kemmerer’s mission promoted the
ongoing concentration in the Latin-American financial system
(see Drake, 1989).6 Kemmerer advised to accelerate bank
concentration and at the same time to amplify credit avail-
ability. Kemmerer’s suggestions made the number of banks in
Colombia to decrease from 35 in 1924 to 16 in 1930. However,4 Claessen and Laeven (2004) found some interesting results regarding a
free entry of foreign banks in and environment of restriction to banks’ activity.
Contestability is relevant and they claim that there is no evidence of negative
relationship between concentration and competitiveness. However, they
contrast to the literature of tradeoff between stability-competition (Northcott,
2004).
5 We have verified the same structure in the remaining countries. The se-
lection of countries follows GDP and outstanding performance during the 90’s.
Bank concentration turns out to be slightly higher after 1990 as well as foreign
participation.
6 Edwin W. Kemmerer (1875e1945) was an American economist who
advised some Latin-American countries, promoting plans to reform the
financial system, fiscal and monetary policies. He advised the governments of
the Philippines (1904), Mexico (1917), Guatemala (1919), Colombia (1923),
Chile (1925), Ecuador (1926) and Peru (1931).the number of regional branches multiplied.7 The same was
observed in the other countries that he advised.
Kemmerer’s plans seemed to have achieved its goals as the
number of credits and deposit soared in the countries he
visited. Moreover, similar policies to the ones suggested by
Kemmerer were implemented in other Latin American coun-
tries that he did not visit.
Kemmerer’s basic idea goes along with the tradeoff be-
tween bank’s efficiency and stability (Northcott, 2004). Banks’
efficiency and competitiveness normally implies a large
number of banks competing and, by competition, efficiency is
achieved. However, efficiency and competitiveness does not
assure stability of the system as it has been seen in this region:
whenever there was a significant capital outflow, small banks
were not able to withstand and most of them closed. Ac-
cording to Kemmerer, the latter situation could be offset by
increasing the concentration in the banking sector allowing
large banks to be less vulnerable to bankruptcy and runs.8
On the other hand, it has been shown in several studies that
efficient functioning of the banking sector and financial
openness contributes to economic growth and development
(Graff, 2003; Kim, Lin, & Suen, 2012; King & Levine, 1993;
Levine, 1997). Other empirical studies (i.e. Fernandez (2005))
have proved empirically the existence of bank lending chan-
nels especially in Latin America. According to this literature,
banks are not only crucial for economic growth but they are
also in an industry that in general is more unstable than other
ones. This instability could have pernicious consequences in
the economy as a whole. For instance as demonstrated by
Peltonen et el. (2011) unexpected variation in the cost of
capital and the lending rate has a negative effect on investment
especially in the Latin American case. Northcott (2004) points
out the following reasons that can explain banks’ instabilities:
 A bank’s balance sheet consists of short-term deposits on
the liability side and, long-term assets that are illiquid.
This leaves banks vulnerable to runs in the presence of
uncertainty and/or sudden stops in capital flows.
 Highly leveraged banks have an incentive to engage in
risky behavior. If the gamble works, shareholders benefit;
if it does not, the lenders bear the cost. This is a typical
agency problem for banks. There is also asymmetrical
information because depositors are not well informed of a
bank’s activities and potential risks.
However, Casu, Girardone, and Molyneux (2013) found
different result in the relationship between competition stability
and competition-fragility described by Northcott (2004). They
found empirically some difficulties associated with competition
and risk in banking industry. In this paper we focus on the7 It is important to note that the four foreign banks present in this country at
that time became even larger than before.
8 Ennis (2005) shows the relevance of large banks in the US and how
important they are in the financial system. However, it is also noted that the
failure of any large bank may collapse the financial system even in a country
like US.
11 In particular we have 2138 observations for the sample of 12 countries.
12 We were not able to collect recent data. However, our scope is to show the
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relationship between competition-stability (fragility). We plan
to work on this relationship as future research.
Based on the issues described above, our starting hypoth-
esis is that internal relative power and efficiency play against
interest rates reductions in the Latin American case. In
particular, we are interested about the relationship of banks’
concentration and efficiency in the system, which potentially
can explain the reasons why interest rates did not decrease
and, incorporate this knowledge to understand the de-
terminants of banks’ profitability for a sample of banks in this
region. For this, we use measures of efficiency, bank con-
centration and relative power that may play important role in
determining banks’ profitability.9 Recent literature such as
Kasman and Carvallo (2013) has also shown us that “banks
with market power. seem to be able to pass on to customers
the cost of raising capital buffers and provisioning for risk”
which leads us to believe that we will find a significant rela-
tionship between market power and efficiency.
In addition, we analyze the latter variables under the four hy-
pothesis claimed by Berger (1995) for an American dataset of
banks. Three of them are: Relative Market Power (RMP), Struc-
ture Conduct Performance (SCP) and Efficient Structure Econ-
omy (ES). The Relative Market Power hypothesis claims that
firmswith largemarket shares andwell-differentiated products are
able to exercise market power (Monopolistic Competition). The
Structure Conduct Performance asserts that concentration permit
less favorable condition to consumers: low rates of deposits and
higher loan rates.10 Finally, the Efficient Structure claims that size
matter for profits because they are scale-dependent. Efficient
Structure permit higher profits because a firm is able to produce at
lower cost in comparison to their competitors.
Our findings presented below suggest that efficiency accounts
for most of the profitability attained by banks. However, our re-
sults also show that concentration (measured as the natural log-
arithm of banks’ total assets) is also an important factor
explaining banks’ profitability. This latter finding together with
the fact that our efficiency measure considers banks’ manage-
ment decision making process by incorporating the necessary
input allocation and product mix decision needed to attract de-
posits and make favorable loans and investments, controlling at
the same time for all risks (market, credit, liquidity, interest,
inflation, among others), shows that banks’ profits grew consis-
tently above the normal levels of profits adjusted by risk, i.e.
meaning that banks in Latin America have been profiting from
their oligopolistic position in detriment of their clients in
particular and of the whole economy in general.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief
descriptionof the data used in this paper andSection3develops the
model specification describing the Data Envelopment Analysis
used to construct our relative efficiency variable for Latin Amer-
icanbanks, Section 4describes the results andSection 5concludes.9 Relative power means the bank local enforcement to handle higher shares
of deposits and loans within the financial system of a particular country.
10 Basically RMP and SCP are classified as market power hypothesis and ES
is under efficient hypothesis.2. Data
The data used in this paper comes from banks’ financial
statements (balance sheets and income statements). The banks
in our simple are located in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Table 3 presents some
descriptive statistics of our sampled banks. It is important to
note that Paraguay and Venezuela have lower shares of equity
in comparison with their pairs in the region; however, their
shares of deposits are higher. For Venezuela, the study period
considers the time financial openness and control of capitals.
As soon as our purpose is to understand what happened to
the banking system in terms of efficiency and concentration
and their impact on banks’ profitability without considering
“abnormal” or crises related periods, our dataset contains
annual observations that covers the years 1989e2005.11 The
period of analysis correspond to the period after financial
openness, the Asian and Russian Crisis that significantly hit
the Latin American region and, just before the subprime or
global financial crisis that started by mid-2007.12
Moreover, we use macroeconomic data from the central
banks: Gross Domestic Product discount rates and exchange
rates13 to account for market or systemic variability.
3. Model specification
As we mentioned before, there is a trade-off between
concentration and efficiency in banking and, Latin American
banks’ have not been the exception. Also, as observed in Ta-
bles 1and 2, the liberalization and openness of the financial
markets did not change the banking structure in the region.14
The period under study allow us to test the determinants of
banks’ profitability based on the literature of concentration
versus efficiency. We explore possible causes of banks’
reluctance to drop interest rates in an environment with good
macroeconomic performance as well as openness and financial
liberalization and, social and political stability. In particular,
our hypothesis is that if banks’ profits grew consistently above
the normal levels of profits adjusted by risk, this could imply
that banks are simply profiting from their oligopolistic posi-
tion in detriment of their clients in particular and of the whole
economy in general. In this section we describe the empirical
model used to test the determinants of banks’ profitability
exploiting the information on the trade-off between efficiency
and concentration of the banking sector in the Latin America.
Besides information on efficiency and concentration, we
include in our model several bank-specific variables as well asstructural changes in the Latin American banking system after financial
openness and before the Global Financial Crisis.
13 GDP was the only significant variable without collinearity problems in the
estimation.
14 Basically the concentration of deposits and assets did not change for the
pre and post liberalization periods.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for our sampled banks.
Country Loans/Assets Equity/Assets Average ROE Deposits/Loans
Argentina 0.421 0.216 8.798 0.396
Bolivia 0.614 0.145 0.777 0.531
Brazil 0.381 0.154 10.407 0.181
Costa Rica 0.635 0.195 12.342 0.344
Ecuador 0.481 0.220 14.170 0.124
El Salvador 0.593 0.150 0.671 0.238
Mexico 0.589 0.193 0.631 0.228
Nicaragua 0.520 0.038 30.798 0.282
Paraguay 0.504 0.142 13.983 1.139
Peru 0.574 0.121 6.923 0.224
Uruguay 0.548 0.386 2.391 0.000
Venezuela 0.383 0.151 38.099 1.114
Table shows the descriptive statistics for the banks in our sample.
Source: Bankscope and authors’ calculations.
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relationships. We follow Forster and Shaeffer (2005) who used
bank efficiency, size and market share as bank specific con-
trols. Forster and Shaeffer (2005) found that there is a positive
relationship between banks’ size and efficiency. Larger banks
have lower cost per assets, possibly resulting from economies
of scale, resulting in lower average costs. Also, according to
their findings, large banks tend to receive higher non-interest
income per dollar of assets due to their choice of product
mix. Finally, they argue that market power and monopsony
power helps larger banks to earn more interest income per
dollar of assets and, allows them to pay lower interest rates on
deposits. In summary, concentration and monopoly power
appears to enable banks to get more benefits that can translate
into larger profits.15 We model “power” including a dummy
variable that identifies the three largest banks, in terms of their
shares of deposit, per country.16 Finally and following King
and Levine (1993) and Levine (1997), we also include real
GDP growth rate in our model to control for any external
factor that may impact banks’ profitability.
We use Data Envelopment Analysis (described in detail
below) to create a variable to control for banks’ efficiency. We
define “size” as the natural logarithm total assets, which is the
proxy for Efficient Structure Hypothesis of Berger (1995). Our
endogenous variable is the return on equity (ROE) which is a
proxy for banks’ profits. Also, our model specification takes
into account the time effect by using period-dummies. Based
on this, the econometric specification is as follows:
ROEijt ¼aþb1Powerijtþb2EFFijtþb3DGDPjtþb4Sizeijt
þb5Timetþ 3t ð1Þ
Where, ROEijt stands for return on equity for bank “i”, country
“j” at time “t”, Power represents dummy that takes on the
value of 1 if the bank is within the largest three banks (in terms15 See also in Berger (1995).
16 This can be the proxy to test Relative Market Power described in Section 1.
Berger used different variables however, the variables used in this paper are a
good proxy of Berger’s Hypothesis.of their deposits share) within a country; EFF17 represents
efficiency as estimated with the DEA methodology, DGDP
stands for real GDP growth rate and Size represents the log-
arithm of banks’ total assets. Finally, Time is a dummy vari-
able that captures the time effect.
In the next section we explain the results of applying the
DEA methodology to estimate the relative efficiency of banks
in Latin America.3.1. Data Envelopment AnalysisOur interest in this section is to present the way we
determine banks’ efficiency. In the past, average productivity
of labor was used to measure efficiency, but this indicator
failed to use all the information of inputs and outputs
available (Farell, 1957). Cooper, Seiford, and Zhu (2004)
provided the following definition of “relative efficiency”
that solves the problem of the efficiency indicator used in the
past:
“A Decision Making Unit (DMU) is to be rated fully effi-
cient on the basis of available evidence if and only if the
performances of other DMUs do not show that some of its
inputs or outputs can be improved without worsening some
of its other inputs or outputs”.
In order to account or better estimate banks’ relative effi-
ciency, we use DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) technique
with Output. The DEA comes from the original work of
Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) as well as Farrel (1957).
The latter introduced the basic idea of measuring relative ef-
ficiency using Euclidean distances from a given observation to
an optimal “relative frontier”. The word “relative” is used
because it is constructed based on sample information. A
DMU (Bank in our case) located on the frontier receives a
score of one while Banks located below the frontier receive
scores lower than one. Charnes et al. (1978) introduced a
linear program to estimate measures of efficiency by intro-
ducing several inputs and outputs at the same time.
In this paper we used as inputs: Fixed Assets, Deposits
and Money Market Funding plus Time Deposit Interest
Expense and Personnel Expenses. The outputs are Interest
Income and Total Earning Assets. The selection of inputs
goes in line with the banking literature. Basically our model
considers banks’ management decision making process by
incorporating the necessary input allocation and product mix
decisions needed to attract deposits and make favorable
loans and investments, controlling at the same time for all
risks (market, credit, operational, liquidity, interest, inflation
risks, among others). We use the same idea of Berger and
Mester (2003) and Barr, Killgo, Siems, and Zimmel
(1999).18 Next section describes the results of the model
presented in this section.1917 It is also a proxy for Efficiency Structure described in Section 1.
18 There are more approaches besides the described above. Also Charnes,
Cooper, Sun, and Huang (1990) and De Young (1998).
19 Also Charnes et al. (1990) and De Young (1998).
Table 4
Summary statistics of efficiency by country.
Country Median Min Max First
quartile
Median Third
quartile
Std
Argentina 0.701 0.052 1 0.413 0.764 1 0.30
Bolivia 0.956 0.652 1 0.916 1 1 0.07
Brazil 0.717 0.080 1 0.518 0.668 1 0.08
Chile1/ n.d n.d n.d n.d n.d n.d n.d
Colombia 0.935 0.605 1 0.868 1 1 0.60
Costa Rica 0.968 0.563 1 1 1 1 0.56
Ecuador 0.875 0.518 1 0.711 1 1 0.52
El Salvador 0.960 0.313 1 1 1 1 0.31
Mexico 0.962 0.314 1 1 1 1 0.31
Paraguay 0.971 0.634 1 0.979 1 1 0.63
Peru 0.963 0.538 1 1 1 1 0.53
Uruguay 0.932 0.273 1 1 1 1 0.27
Venezuela 0.918 0.399 1 0.872 0.987 1 0.40
The Table shows the summary statistics of efficiency by country.
Source: Authors’ estimations. Efficiency estimates range from 0 to 1. Score of
1 indicates maximum efficiency within the country while scores that are lower
than 1 indicate various levels of inefficiency.
Table 5
Summary statistics of efficiency by period.
Period Mean Min Max 1Q 2Q 3Q
1989 0.976 0.928 1 0.928 1 1
1990 0.945 0.382 1 1 1 1
1991 0.996 0.909 1 1 1 1
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Table 4 presents the summary statistics of efficiency for
each country and for all periods. For the case of Chile we were
unable to estimate the efficiency due to a lack of access to data
within the country. This indicator of efficiency is a relative
ranking for each of the countries under assessment. For
example, if a bank in Argentina gets a score of 1, it does not
mean that the bank is the best for the whole Latin American
region but only with respect to Argentine, in this example.
Table 5 shows the summary statistics for each period of
time. This is an average measure for the whole sample of
countries. The estimation is able to replicate the drop of ef-
ficiency during the Asian Crisis and Russian crisis of 1998.
Then later efficiency recovered steadily up to 2005, the end of
our period of study.
The following table presents the results of the model
specification described above. We have four different models
that combine different specification of the basic model. Some
models control for year effect. We cannot include Size and
Power at the same time due to high correlation between these
two variables.20 In models 3 and 4, we have added the variable
“Size” and obtained positive results, which support our
conclusion that market power and size of banks avoid drop of
bank’s margins.21
In Table 6 we can observe that the efficiency variable (EFF)
is always positive and statistically significant, meaning that the
better a bank manages its inputs and outputs, the higher its
profits are. This result goes in line with the study of Berger
(1995).22
The variable Power is always positive but statistically non-
significant which goes along the line of Berger (1995) hy-
pothesis for Relative Market Power. The variable Size is al-
ways positive and significant which goes along the line of the
hypothesis of Berger (1995) of Efficient Structure Economy.
The last two results combined imply that there is an influence
of local concentration (measured by Power) plus Size that
avoids the drop of spreads. The hypothesis of Berger has been
proved for a Latin American Sample.23 Note that the magni-
tude of this variable is not small as it accounts for almost 40%
of the influence of the variable efficiency.2420 The R2 was typically low for the type of specification that we have
considered. Our purpose is not to predict but to find the explanatory variables
for Earnings Returns, a proxy for banks’ profits.
21 However, besides Forster and Shaeffer (2005) there is a paper of
Chortareas et al. (2002) and Berger (1995) who goes along the line with our
results. The latter is proved for an American sample but the former is tested for
a Latin American dataset of banks.
22 This supports the hypothesis of efficiency structure described in Section 1.
23 Berger also claims the Structure Conduct Hypothesis where benefits cannot
be obtained as long as banks are big and concentrate most of the loans and
deposits. We may infer this situation from our results with the variables power
and size.
24 We obtain this number dividing the value of the coefficient related to Size
by the value of the coefficient of efficiency (EFF). For example, looking at
model 3 results, the coefficient related to efficiency equals 18.699 and the one
from market concentration equals 7.082, i.e. accounts for approximately 40%
of the magnitude of the first one.As has been seen these results support the hypothesis claimed
byBerger for a different set of data. However, our results contrast
with the ones obtained by Forster and Shaeffer (2005), who
found that large banks are not necessarily an artifact of market
power. However, we agree with them in their argument that
market power and monopsony power help larger banks to earn
more interest income per dollar of assets and, allow them to pay
lower interest rates on deposits, respectively.
The variable GDP is always positive (statistically signifi-
cant under models 1 and 4) meaning that good macroeconomic
conditions affect positively banks’ profitability. Basically this
variable is relevant for bank loans, deposits as well as profit-
ability. Downturns in the GDP cycles deteriorate banks’1992 0.954 0.508 1 0.973 1 1
1993 0.946 0.476 1 0.973 1 1
1994 0.844 0.176 1 0.703 1 1
1995 0.876 0.144 1 0.762 1 1
1996 0.909 0.409 1 0.862 1 1
1997 0.800 0.080 1 0.544 1 1
1998 0.739 0.217 1 0.487 0.797 1
1999 0.769 0.265 1 0.501 0.915 1
2000 0.814 0.077 1 0.610 0.944 1
2001 0.809 0.081 1 0.632 0.929 1
2002 0.857 0.052 1 0.778 1 1
2003 0.797 0.101 1 0.597 1 1
2004 0.850 0.231 1 0.714 1 1
2005 0.944 0.403 1 0.926 1 1
The Table shows the summary statistics of efficiency by period. Efficiency
estimates range from 0 to 1. Score of 1 indicates maximum efficiency for the
overall region while scores that are lower than 1 indicate various levels of
inefficiency.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
Table 6
Determinants of ROE.a
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 7.669
(5.1855)
6.288
(7.8132)
32.415***
(9.8188)
29.952***
(7.1924)
Power 7.624
(4.7091)
6.516
(4.7683)
EFF 15.986***
(5.7446)
18.030***
(5.8868)
18.699***
(5.8454)
17.003***
(5.6981)
GDP 0.468**
(0.2256)
0.434
(0.2786)
0.455
(0.2779)
0.4543**
(0.2250)
Size 7.082***
(1.5976)
6.852***
(1.5406)
Time Dummy NO YES YES NO
Observations 2138 2138 2138 2138
R2 0.0157 0.0265 0.0508 0.0433
The Table above shows the results of our estimations using Equation (1).
ROEijt stands for return on equity for bank “i”, country “j” at time “t”, Power
represents dummy that takes on the value of 1 if the bank is within the largest
three banks (in terms of their deposits share) within a country; EFF represents
efficiency as estimated with the DEA methodology, GDP stands for real GDP
growth rate and Size represents the logarithm of banks’ total assets. Finally,
Time is a dummy variable that captures the time effect. *** Significant at 1%,
** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.
a We have run the Haussman test and rejected the possibility of Random
Effects in the sample.
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changes from all the periods our dataset exerts no significant
influence in the results, the coefficients of the other variables
included in the models are consistent and change very little.
5. Conclusion
Basically microeconomic or banking variables captured by
our efficiency variable estimated using Data Envelopment
Analysis methodology and macroeconomic conditions of a
country (proxied by the changes in GDP) positively influence
banks’ profitability (measured as the return on equity). Also,
whenever we control for size (local power) or market concen-
tration we also found a positive, statistically significant (insig-
nificant) and large in magnitude effect on banks’ profitability.
This latter finding together with the fact that our efficiency
measure considers bank management decision making process
by incorporating the necessary input allocation and product
mix decision needed to attract deposits and make favorable
loans and investments, controlling at the same time for all
risks (market, credit, liquidity, interest, inflation, among
others), shows that banks’ profits grew consistently above the
normal levels of profits adjusted by risk, meaning that banks in
Latin America have been profiting from their oligopolistic
position in detriment of their clients in particular and of the
whole economy in general. These results also could explain
inefficiencies in terms of non-observed decreases on banks’
interest rates throughout the Latin American region.
The results of the paper test the hypothesis of Relative
Market Power (RMP), Structure Conduct Performance (SCP)
and Efficient Structure (ES) claimed by Berger for an Amer-
ican Dataset. We have concluded that the latter hypothesis
holds for our Latin American sample. It means that bank’sprofits depend on size (ES hypothesis) as well as Power
(RMP) and both together make Structure Conduct Perfor-
mance (SCP) hypothesis to hold.
Our result is relevant for policy makers who look for
alignment of interests between banks and customers in
particular and economic development in general. Note how-
ever, that we have not considered the tradeoff between effi-
ciency and stability which was beyond the scope of our study.
Whenever we look for efficiency to drop bank’s profits then a
problem of bank stability may be triggered. We leave this
interesting topic for future research.
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